The pro-Western Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), in power since 2021, is leading in the polls with support between 30 percent and 40 percent.
That would place it well ahead of its rivals—but still short of the 52 seats needed for a majority in the 101-seat legislature.
President Maia Sandu, who secured re-election last year despite what observers described as massive Russian interference, is hoping her party wins by a wide enough margin to govern effectively.
Analysts say the stakes are high: only a decisive PAS victory would guarantee the continuation of Moldova’s pro-European course.
The challenge is that PAS has no obvious coalition partner. Over the past four years in government, it has monopolized the pro-European space, leaving no other viable, reformist party above the 5-percent threshold. Potential partners in parliament are either openly or quietly pro-Russian.
The leftist Patriotic Bloc, led by former presidents Igor Dodon and Vladimir Voronin, has ruled out cooperation, calling instead for rapprochement with Moscow.
Another opposition group, the Alternative Bloc, includes leaders who have clashed directly with PAS, among them Alexandr Stoianoglo, the former prosecutor-general ousted by Sandu’s party, and Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chisinau, whose political past in the Communist Party and ties to Dodon fuel doubts about his pro-European credentials.
Other figures, such as populist Renato Usatîi, head of the “Our Party,” are seen as too erratic—and in Usatîi’s case, too compromised by murky Russian connections—to be reliable partners.
With few coalition options, the government has sought to maximize turnout among Moldovans abroad, whose votes proved decisive in Sandu’s re-election.
Authorities opened more than 300 polling stations outside the country—70 more than last year—almost all in Western Europe. Only two stations will operate in Russia, and 12 in the Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria.
The vote comes after a year of aggressive moves by the Sandu government to curb Russian influence.
Officials say Moscow poured USD 40 million into vote-buying operations in 2023 through fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor’s political network, and may be preparing to spend 10 times that amount this year.
In July, authorities banned the Victory Bloc—made up of Șor’s parties—from the election, and in August a court sentenced Evghenia Guțul, the Moscow-backed governor of the autonomous Gagauzia region, to seven years in prison for channeling Kremlin money into Șor’s party.
Sandu underscored the stakes in a televised address on September 22, warning that Moldova’s independence, territorial integrity and EU path were on the line.
“If pro-Russian forces win, these values will be threatened, and the country could be dragged into the war in Ukraine,” she said.
If PAS fails to secure a majority, analysts say all scenarios are possible: attempts to lure individual deputies into an alliance, formation of a minority government, blocking of an opposition-led Cabinet, delaying tactics that could trigger fresh elections, or even refusal to recognize the result.
For now, one thing is clear—the days and weeks ahead are likely to be tense between the Dniester and the Prut.
Tadeusz Iwański
Tadeusz Iwański
The author is head of the Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova department at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). From 2006 to 2011, he worked at Polskie Radio dla Zagranicy, the Polish public broadcaster's international service.
For more on the story, click the audio icon above to hear a report by Marcin Matuszewski.